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* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 




Raul Rodriguez-Galvez seeks review of the final agency order authorizing his 
removal from the United States.  We will deny his petition for review. 
I. 
Rodriguez-Galvez is a citizen of Honduras.  In 2018, he arrived at the United 
States’ southern border to seek asylum, claiming fear of harm based on kinship ties—
local criminals stole the family farm, killed Rodriguez-Galvez’s father and brother, and 
attempted to kill him as well—as well as an imputed political opinion of ‘supporting law 
and order.’  An immigration judge (IJ) found Rodriguez-Galvez inadmissible under 8 
U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) (making inadmissible aliens who seek admission without 
valid travel documents).  A merits hearing on his applications for relief followed. 
 The IJ found that Rodriguez-Galvez’s testimony at the hearing was not credible.  
The IJ determined that, even if the testimony were credible, asylum should still be 
denied.  While determining that past harm to Rodriguez-Galvez was persecution-level 
severe, and that his asserted particular social group (“PSG”) of kinship ties was 
cognizable, the IJ found no nexus between the harm and the PSG.1  The IJ also 
 
 
1 The IJ’s recognition of Rodriguez-Galvez’s nuclear family as a PSG was based on 
Matter of L-E-A-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 40, 42 (BIA 2017), overruled in part by 27 I. & N. 
Dec. 581 (A.G. 2019), which has since fallen out of favor at the agency level, see, e.g., L-
E-A-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 586 (“In the ordinary case, a family group will not [be a PSG], 
because it will not have the kind of identifying characteristics that render the family 
socially distinct within the society in question.”); Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 




determined that Rodriguez-Galvez failed to advance a cognizable imputed political 
opinion and that, regardless, there is no evidence of the required nexus between such an 
opinion and any harm that might befall Rodriguez-Galvez if removed to Honduras.  The 
IJ denied withholding of removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act based on the 
same reasons it denied asylum.  The IJ denied relief under the Convention Against 
Torture (CAT) because there was no evidence that the Honduran government would 
acquiesce to any harm inflicted upon Rodriguez-Galvez.  
 On appeal, the BIA assumed, arguendo, that Rodriguez-Galvez’s testimony was 
credible, and it affirmed the decision of the IJ.  The BIA determined that both the CAT 
claim and the claim based on a kinship PSG were unbriefed and thus waived.2  As for 
Rodriguez-Galvez’s claim based on an imputed political opinion, the BIA agreed with the 
IJ that there was no evidence of nexus and, separately, rejected the argument that the IJ 
misapplied the burden of proof. 




[PSG].”).  For its part, this Court has observed that kinship can “be a defining 
characteristic” of a PSG. S.E.R.L. v. Att’y Gen., 894 F.3d 535, 556 (3d Cir. 2018).      
 
2 The counseled BIA brief filed Rodriguez-Galvez focused almost exclusively on the IJ’s 
adverse credibility determination.  It does not appear that Rodriguez-Galvez has filed a 
motion to reopen, based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under Matter of 





We have jurisdiction to review final orders of removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1). 
But we may do so only to the extent that “the alien has exhausted all administrative 
remedies available to the alien as of right[.]” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1).  Under § 1252(d)(1), 
an alien is required “to raise or exhaust his or her remedies as to each claim or ground for 
relief [before the BIA] if he or she is to preserve the right of judicial review of that 
claim.” Hoxha v. Holder, 559 F.3d 157, 159 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation and internal 
quotations omitted).  That exhaustion requirement is dispositive here.   
We recognize that substantial time was put into crafting Rodriguez-Galvez’s 
opening brief.  However, due to the narrowly focused appellate briefing by Rodriguez-
Galvez’s counsel before the BIA, see AR 5-12, all but one of the issues raised here is 
unexhausted and thus unreviewable.3 
The one issue presented in the opening brief that was properly exhausted before 
the BIA is Rodriguez-Galvez’s challenge to the IJ’s adverse credibility determination.  
But we are reviewing the BIA’s decision, and consider the IJ’s decision only insofar as 
the BIA deferred to it. See Roye v. Att’y Gen., 693 F.3d 333, 339 (3d Cir. 2012).  For 
that reason, arguments about the IJ’s adverse credibility determination, see Pet’r Br. at 
 
3 Rodriguez-Galvez does not challenge the BIA’s ruling that issues concerning the 
kinship PSG and CAT claims were waived.  We discern no basis to disturb the BIA’s 
waiver ruling. Cf. Uddin v. Att’y Gen., 870 F.3d 282, 288-89 (3d Cir. 2017), as 





16, inclusive of whether medical evidence corroborated testimony about Rodriguez-
Galvez’s gunshot wound, see id. at 19, are inapt; the BIA assumed on appeal that the 
testimony was credible, and we would do the same. See Sandie v. Att’y Gen., 562 F.3d 
246, 250 (3d Cir. 2009). 
Finally, we observe that we could have considered arguments concerning 
Rodriguez-Galvez’s claim of persecution on account of an allegedly imputed political 
opinion.  But no such arguments are presented, let alone developed, in the opening brief, 
so they are waived. See In re: Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 873 F.3d 232, 237 
(3d Cir. 2017). 
Accordingly, for the reasons outlined above, Rodriguez-Galvez’s petition for 
review will be denied.  
